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because it failed to evaluate his residual functional capacity. Specifically, Prichard 
emphasized that no mention is made in the report of any functional capacity evaluation 
performed by the panel. The essence of Prichard's argument is that a medical 
professional cannot issue work restrictions without conducting a functional capacity 
evaluation.2 However, Prichard offers no support for this novel argument. Indeed, based 
upon Prichard's argument, the work restrictions issued by Dr. Bova, Dr. Chung, and Dr. 
Bender, upon which he relies for his claim to permanent total disability, would also be 
disregarded on the basis that those physicians did not perform any functional capacity 
evaluations prior to issuing restrictions. The Medical Panel's conclusion with respect to 
Prichard's work restrictions was based upon its experience, its examination of Prichard 
and a review of all of the medical evidence. The Commission's determination to adopt 
such conclusion was reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, Prichard's argument 
regarding the necessity for conducting a functional capacity evaluation should be 
disregarded. 
Additionally, Prichard argues that the Medical Panel's conclusion regarding work 
restrictions should be disregarded because there was no conclusion as to whether he could 
perform his work functions continuously over an 8 hour work day. However, in the July 
28, 2005 addendum Medical Panel Report, Dr. Momberger clarified that the "light to 
2
 A functional capacity evaluation is usually a series of physical tasks conducted by a 
physical therapist over the course of one or two days to assess a person's physical ability to 
perform the tasks generally to be applied to a specific job's requirements. 
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moderate restriction" from Disability Evaluation is based upon an 8-hour day. Thus, 
through the July 28, 2005 addendum, the Medical Panel made it clear that Prichard was 
capable of performing "light to moderate" work for an 8-hour day. Accordingly, Prichard 
has provided no legal or factual basis for rejection of the Medical Panel's conclusion 
regarding his permanent work restrictions. There is no case law, statute or rule that 
suggests work restrictions may only be assigned after a functional capacity evaluation is 
performed. 
Through the Medical Panel Report and the July 28, 2005 addendum, the Medical 
Panel made it clear that its conclusion with respect to permanent work restrictions was 
made in reliance upon the Department of Labor Guidelines as set forth in Disability 
Evaluation, Second Edition, which is published by the American Medical Association. 
The Medical Panel's opinion was based upon its examination of Prichard in conjunction 
with all of the medical evidence provided by the Labor Commission. The conclusion was 
reasonably adopted by the Commission and should not be disturbed. 
II. The Administrative Law Judge Properly Determined that Prichard is Not 
Permanently Totally Disabled, 
Permanent total disability claims require a four part analysis under U.C.A. § 34A-
2-413(1). The only aspects of the Commission's analysis under attack are its review 
under subsections (l)(c), primarily subsection (iv), and (d). However, Prichard has 
misquoted subsection (d) and the Commission's analysis under subsection (c) was 
appropriate. 
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A. Evidence of Entitlement to Social Security Disability does not Create a 
Presumption of Permanent Total Disability. 
Prichard argues that the administrative law judge failed to perform the proper 
analysis under Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10(D) in determining that he is capable of 
performing other work reasonably available. Prichard's argument hinges on his 
misreading of Section 34A-2-413(l)(d). Prichard alleges that the statute provides that 
the: 
employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those 
provided under this chapter . . . may be presented to the 
commission, but is not binding, and creates a [sic] 
presumption to entitlement under this chapter . . . 
(Emphasis by Prichard) Petitioner's Brief at 14. However, the statute, now, and at the 
time of accident, actually reads as follows: 
Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits 
other than those provided under this chapter . . . , if relevant, 
may be presented to the commission, but is not binding, and 
creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter . . 
(Emphasis added). Based on Prichard's misquoting the statute, his argument has no 
support and should be disregarded. 
B. The ALJ Properly Determined that Prichard is Capable of Performing 
Other Work Reasonably Available. 
Prichard also argues that the administrative law judge failed to consider and 
analyze the acceptable commuting distance and wage requirements pursuant to Rule 612-
1-10(D). However, the argument focuses primarily on issues with the vocational expert's 
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testimony and issues with the medical panel restrictions, the latter having already been 
addressed. 
1. The Evidence Supports a Finding that Other Work was 
Reasonably Available when Considering both Wage and 
Location Requirements. 
In regards to the location and wage of the other work reasonably available, the 
record demonstrates that the administrative law judge and the Commission, as the 
ultimate finder of fact, considered all of the necessary factors and weighed all of the 
evidence including the testimony of vocational expert Dirk Evertsen, in finding that other 
work was reasonably available which met the wage and commuting requirements of Rule 
612-1-10(D). 
During the administrative hearing, vocational expert, Dirk Evertsen, testified that 
he had identified 44 jobs in the Utah area and 14 in Florida in the sedentary to light 
category which Prichard was capable of performing. Mr. Evertsen identified 14 jobs in 
Florida within a 50 mile radius of Prichard's zip code including a loan officer job in the 
$40,000 to $60,000 range with no experience necessary and another position in the 
$32,000 to $43,000 range.3 The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that the identified job 
or jobs must exist "within a reasonable proximity of [the injured worker's] usual 
residence or residences." Hoskings v. Industrial Commission. 918 P.2d 150, 158 (Utah 
App. 1996). Mr. Evertsen's testimony, which was unrebutted, provided evidence that 
3
 The State Average Weekly Wage for Prichard's date of injury was $509. Annualized, 
this equates to $26,468. 
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other work was available within a typical or acceptable commuting distance from either 
of Prichard's residences (current or at the time of the accident) and that the available 
work provides a gross income greater than the current state average weekly wage. 
2. The Commission Properly Relied on the Evidence, Including the 
Medical Panel's Work Restrictions, and Determined That 
Prichard Could Perform Other Work Was Reasonably 
Available. 
In regards to Mr. Prichard's functional capacity, this argument has been addressed 
above in responding to Prichard's contentions with the medical panel report. The panel 
determined, and the Commission accepted, that Prichard is capable of working in the light 
to moderate category. Based on that ability, Mr. Evertsen testified that appropriate jobs 
were available. However, in making the argument that he does not have the functional 
capacity to work, Prichard disregards the medical panel's opinion that he is capable of 
performing light to moderate work. By definition, as noted by the panel, this includes 
work up to 35 pounds during an eight hour work day. The panel did not assign any 
additional restrictions, such as the need to lie down. 
The medical dispute over Prichard's functional capacity, i.e., his restrictions, was 
sent to the panel based on differing opinions from Drs. Bender, Bova and Chung 
compared to those from Dr. Knorpp. When issues go before a medical panel, the medical 
dispute can only be resolved in favor of one party. In this case, the panel's opinion was 
favorable to respondents. Therefore, in his argument, Prichard relies on the restrictions 
assigned by Dr. Bender only, namely no lifting over 10 pounds and the need to lie down. 
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Dr. Benders' restrictions do not, however, dictate the functional capacity in this case - the 
panel's do. Therefore, Prichard's reliance on Dr. Bender's restrictions is misplaced. 
Because of the difference in restrictions from the various doctors at the time of the 
hearing, Mr. Evertsen had to address various possibilities from moderate to sedentary 
work, with the understanding that if one can work in a certain category, one can always 
work in a category that is more restrictive, e.g., if one can perform light work, one can 
also perform sedentary work. In doing so, he testified that Prichard would be capable of 
performing work in the sedentary to light category, specifically identifying jobs with 
lifting requirements between 20-25 pounds. (Record Vol. 2 at 46-25 to 47-5). 
Based on Mr. Evertsen's testimony that jobs were available to Prichard with lifting 
of less than 25 pounds, and the medical panel's determination of a 35 pound lifting 
capability, the Commission properly determined that Prichard had the residual function to 
perform other work reasonably available. 
In short, and as noted above, the administrative law judge, and subsequently the 
Commission, specifically referenced the definition of "other work reasonably available" 
under Utah Administrative Rule 612-1-10(D). The administrative law judge further set 
forth facts addressing the criteria found in Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv): (1) Prichard has 
the ability to lift up to 35 pounds occasionally and 18 pounds frequently as determined by 
the Medical Panel (medical and residual functional capacity); (2) Prichard possesses a 
bachelor's degree in business management (education); (3) Prichard has the ability to sit, 
15 
stand, and walk alternately, and was able to sit through both the hearing and the 
deposition (residual functional capacity); (4) Prichard worked in management for K-Mart 
supervising 80-90 employees and running a large retail store (past work experience); (5) 
prior to working for K-Mart, Prichard was in the military and trained as an administrative 
specialist, running an academic library and maintaining classroom materials, and as a 
heavy equipment operator (past work experience); (6) Prichard has a high level of 
education and a significant management background (education and past work 
experience); (7) the medical panel and vocational expert, Dirk Evertsen, both concluded 
that the most significant obstacle to Prichard's return to work was his perception of 
himself as disabled (panel addressed medical and residual functional capacity, and the 
vocational expert applied those to age, education and past work experience). (Record 
Vol. 1 at 108). The Commission subsequently found that Prichard, at the time of the 
Order, was 48 years old. (Record Vol. 1 at 145). Again, these facts establish the criteria 
set forth in Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv), namely age, education, past work experience, 
medical capacity and residual functional capacity. 
Based upon the foregoing factors, the administrative law judge concluded, and the 
Commission upheld, that Prichard "has significant education and experience in 
management to find other employment in business management, human resources and 
customer service." (Record Vol. 1 at 108). Additionally, the administrative law judge 
concluded that "Mr. Evertsen identified employment which meets [Prichard's] objective 
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physical capacity and is reasonably available to him based upon his current skills and 
education level." (Record Vol. 1 at 108). As outlined above, the evidence obtained from 
Mr. Evertsen included jobs within a reasonable commuting distance and at wages higher 
than the current average weekly wage. Based upon the evidence that such jobs existed 
and were available, the administrative law judge properly concluded that other work was 
reasonably available to Prichard in accordance with the definition set forth in Utah 
Administrative Rule 612-1-10(D). 
CONCLUSION 
The Medical Panel assigned proper work restrictions to Prichard that fell within 
the light to moderate work categories. The ALJ and Commission properly relied on these 
restrictions and, in combination with the vocational expert's opinion, concluded that 
Prichard could perform other work reasonably available. Thus, the Commission's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Entitlement to Social Security Disability 
does not create a presumption of entitlement to permanent total disability benefits. 
Therefore, the Commission's decision should be upheld. 
DATED this 2 > day of /t/ltiL , 2009. 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
y^AARK R<^lM§ION 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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Addendum A 
Statutes and Rules 
393 UTAH LABOR CODE 34A-2-413 
maximum of 66-V3% of the state average weekly wage a t the 
time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid. 1997 
34A-2-413. P e r m a n e n t t o t a l d i sab i l i t y — A m o u n t of 
p a y m e n t s — R e h a b i l i t a t i o n . 
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from 
an industrial accident or occupational disease, the em-
ployee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disabil-
ity compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(1) the employee sustained a significant impair-
ment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease tha t gives 
rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; 
and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease 
was the direct cause of the employee's permanent 
total disability. 
(c) l b find an employee permanently totally disabled, 
the commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combina-
tion of impairments tha t limit the employee's ability 
to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused im-
pairment or combination of impairments prevent the 
employee from performing the essential functions of 
the work activities for which the employee has been 
qualified until the t ime of the industrial accident or 
occupational disease tha t is the basis for the employ-
ee's permanent total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work rea-
sonably available, taking into consideration the em-
ployee's age, education, pas t work experience, medi-
cal capacity, and residual functional capacity. 
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability 
benefits other than those provided under this chapter and 
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant, 
may be presented to the commission, but is not binding 
and creates no presumption of an entit lement under this 
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the 
initial 312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-%% of 
tbe employee's average weekly wage a t the time of the injury, 
United as follows: 
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% 
of the state average weekly wage a t the t ime of the injury; 
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the 
sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus 
$5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee a t 
the time of the injury; and 
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly 
compensation rate under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 36% of 
the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
°ut of and in the course of the employee's employment on or 
Wore June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability com-
pensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in 
effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34 A-
2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks a t the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate 
under Subsection (2) 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shal l be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from; 
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the] 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensation 
rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all 
remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall com-
mence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or 
Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or 
after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-
2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation ra te 
under Subsection (2) 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by 
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future 
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Sub-
section (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after 
an employee has received compensation from the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of dis-
abilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation a t the 
applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, 
to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of 
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the em-
ployee during the same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a sum-
mary of reemployment activities undertaken pursu-
an t to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemploy-
ment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance earner submits 
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan 
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider 
reasonably designed to return the employee to gain-
ful employment or the employer or its insurance 
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice 
tha t the employer or its insurance carrier will not 
submit a plan, and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to 
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipu-
lated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation 
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by 
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the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsec-
tion (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administra-
tive law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability com-
pensation payments to provide for the employee's 
subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or 
medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given 
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection 
(6Xb) against its ultimate disability compensation liabil-
ity under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer 
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the 
plan is subject to Subsections (6Xd)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, 
medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
placement services, or incentives calculated to facili-
tate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable 
disability compensation to provide for the employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall 
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The em-
ployer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently 
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
administrative law judge On the administrative law 
judge's own motion to make a final decision of perma-
nent total disability 
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administra-
tive law judge shall order that the employee be paid 
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the 
employee became permanently totally disabled, as deter-
mined by a final order of the commission based on the 
facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
(ii) when the employee is capahle of returning to 
regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or 
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee rea-
sonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job 
earning at least minimum wage provided that employ-
ment may not be required to the extent that it would 
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability 
benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement 
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medi-
cally appropriate, part time work. 
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employ-
ee^ gross income from the work provided under Subsec-
tion (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier 
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability 
compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess 
of $500. 
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally 
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, 
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained 
in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding 
the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under 
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The emploj'er or its insurance carrier shall have tfig 
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate par§ 
time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any jog 
that would reqiure the employee to undertake work 
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual 
functional capacity or for good cause; or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to re-
duce permanent total disability benefits as provided in 
Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate 
part-time employment has been offered but the employee 
has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the em-
ployee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent 
partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an 
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the 
employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemploy-
ment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss 
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the 
administrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully 
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific 
findings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use 
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, 
or any combination of two such body members constitutes 
total and permanent disability, to be compensated accord-
ing to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to 
Subsection (10Xa) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodi-
cally reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except 
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or 
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility 
to determine whether the worker remains permanently 
totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than 
once every three years after an award is final, unless good 
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexanrination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical 
evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilita-
tion evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax 
Returns; 
(v) employee certification pf compliance with Sec-
tion 34A-2-1L0; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or 
questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for 
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee 
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel 
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert 
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the 
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at 
the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reason-
able reexamination of a permanent total disability find-
ing, an administrative law judge may order the suspen-
sion of the employee's permanent total disability benefits 
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total 
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably 
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raises the issue of an employee's continued entitle-
ment to permanent total disability compensation 
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may 
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing 
on tha t issue. The petition shall be accompanied by 
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-in-
sured employer's belief tha t the employee is no longer 
permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (ll)(f)(i) dem-
onstrates good cause, as determined by the Division 
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall 
adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in 
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the 
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent 
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the 
employee's participation in medically appropriate, 
part-t ime work under Subsection (7) may be consid-
ered in the reexamination or hearing with other 
evidence relating to the employee's s ta tus and condi-
tion, 
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the admin-
istrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees 
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the 
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the 
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee 
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. 
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total 
disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication 
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured 
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall con-
tinue to pay the permanent total disability compensation 
benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
34A-2-414. Benefi ts in c a s e of death — Distr ibut ion of 
a w a r d to dependents — Death of d e p e n d e n t s 
— Remarriage of surviv ing spouse . 
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or 
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of 
all the dependents, as may be determined by an admin-
istrative law judge. 
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion the 
benefits among the dependents in the manner t ha t the 
administrative law judge considers jus t and equitable. 
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be 
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proper, 
and shall operate to discharge all other claims. 
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid, 
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries 
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the 
administrative law judge. 
(3) In all cases of death when: 
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or 
more minor children, j t shall be sufficient for the surviv-
ing spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudi-
cation on behalf of tha t individual and the minor children; 
and 
(b) all of the dependents are minors, the application 
shall be made by the guardian or next friend of the minor 
dependents. 
(4) The administrative law judge may, for the purpose of 
Protecting the rights and interests of any minor dependents 
°te administrative law judge considers incapable of doing so, 
provide a method of safeguarding any payments due the minor 
dependents. 
(5) Should any dependent of a deceased employee die dur-
ing the period covered by weekly payments authorized by this 
section, the right of the deceased dependent to compensation 
under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act, shall cease. 
(6) (a) If a surviving spouse, who is a dependent of a 
deceased employee and who is receiving the benefits of 
this chapter or Chapter 3 remarries, tha t individual's sole 
right after the remarriage to further payments of compen-
sation shall be the right to receive in a lump sum the 
lesser of: 
(i) the balance of the weekly compensation pay-
ments unpaid from the time of remarriage to the end 
of six years or 312 weeks from the date of the injury 
from which death resulted; or 
(ii) an amount equal to 52 weeks of compensation 
at the weekly compensation rate the surviving spouse 
was receiving a t the time of such remarriage, 
(b) (i) If there are other dependents remaining a t the 
time of remarriage, benefits payable under this chap-
ter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, 
shall be paid to such person as an administrative law 
judge may determine, for the use and benefit of the 
other dependents. 
(ii) The weekly benefits to be paid under Subsec-
tion (6Xb)(i) shall be paid a t intervals of not less than 
four weeks. 1997 
34A-2-415. Increase of award to chi ldren and depen-
dent spouse — Effect of death, marriage, ma-
jority, or terminat ion of dependency of chil-
dren — Death, divorce, or remarriage of 
spouse. 
If an award is made to, or increased because of a dependent 
spouse or dependent minor child or children, as provided in 
this chapter or Chapter 3, U tah Occupational Disease Act, the 
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease at: 
(1) the death, marriage, at tainment of the age of 18 
years, or termination of dependency of the minor child or 
children; or 
(2) upon the death, divorce, or remarriage of the spouse 
of the employee, subject to the provisions in Section 
34A-2-414 relative to the remarriage of a spouse. 1998 
34A-2-416. Addit ional benefits in special cases , 
(1) An administrative law judge may extend indefinitely 
benefits received by a wholly dependent person under this 
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if at the 
termination of the benefits: 
(a) the wholly dependent person is still in a dependent 
condition; and 
(b) under all reasonable circumstances the wholly de-
pendent person should be entitled to additional benefits. 
(2) If benefits are extended under Subsection (1): 
(a) the liability of the employer or insurance carrier 
involved may not be extended; and 
(b) the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund created in Subsection 
34A-2-702U). 1997 
34A-2-417. Claims a n d benefits — Time l imits for filing 
— Burden of proof. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonperma-
nent total disability cases an employee's medical benefit 
enti t lement ceases if for a period of three consecutive years the 
employee does not: 
(a) incur medical expenses reasonably related to the 
industrial accident; and 
discovered information may be allowed. 
R612-1-8* Insurance Carrier/Employer Liability• 
A. This rule governs responsibility for payment of workers' 
compensation benefits for industrial accidents when: 
1. The worker's ultimate entitlement to benefits is not in 
dispute; but 
2. There is a dispute between self-insured employers and/or 
insurers regarding their respective liability for the injured worker' s 
benefits arising out of separate industrial accidents which are 
compensable under Utah law. 
B. In cases meeting the criteria of subsection A, the 
self-insured employer or insurer providing workers' compensation 
coverage for the most recent compensable injury shall advance workers 1 
compensation benefits to the injured worker. The benefits advanced 
shall be limited to medical benefits and temporary total disability 
compensation. The benefits advanced shall be paid according to the 
entitlement in effect on the date of the earliest related injury. 
1. The self-insured employer or insurance carrier advancing 
benefits shall notify the non-advancing party(s) within the time 
periods as specified in rule R612-1-7, that benefits are to be advanced 
pursuant to this rule. 
2. The self-insured employers or insurers not advancing 
benefits, upon notification from the advancing party, shall notify 
the advancing party within 10 working days of any potential defenses 
or limitations of the non-advancing party(s) liability. 
C. The parties are encouraged to settle liabilities pursuant 
to this rule, however, any party may file a request for agency action 
with the Commission for determination of liability for the workers' 
compensation benefits at issue. 
D. The medical utilization decisions of the self-insured 
employer or insurer advancing benefits pursuant to this rule shall 
be presumed reasonable with respect to the issue of reimbursement. 
R612-1-9* Compensation Agreements. 
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or employer may enter 
into a compensation agreement for the purpose* of resolving a worker's 
compensation claim. Compensation agreements must be approved by the 
Commission. The compensation agreement must be that contained on 
Form 019 of the Commission forms and shall include the following 
information: 
1. Signatures of the parties involved; 
2. Form 122 - Employer's First Report of Injury; 
3. Doctor's report of impairment rating; 
4. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement. 
B. Failure to provide any of the above documentation and forms 
may result in the return of the compensation agreement to the carrier 
or self-insured employer without approval. 
R612-1-10. Permanent Total Disability, 
A. This rule applies to claims for permanent total disability 
compensation under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
1. Subsection B applies to permanent total disability claims 
arising from accident or disease prior to May 1, 1995. 
2. Subsection C applies to permanent total disability claims 
arising from accident or disease on or after May 1, 1995, 
B. For claims arising from accident or disease on or after July 
1, 1988 and prior to May 1, 1995, the Commission is required under 
Section 34A-2-413, to make a finding of total disability as measured 
by the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the 
Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, amended April 1, 1993. The use of the term "substance 
of the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some 
latitude on the Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in 
making its findings relative to permanent total disability. The 
Commission does not interpret the code section to eliminate the 
requirement that a finding by the Commission in permanent and total 
disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until 
rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been accomplished. 
1. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its 
designee has made, or is in the process of making, a determination 
of disability under the foregoing process, the Commission may use 
this information in lieu of instituting the process on its own behalf. 
2. In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker 
has qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission 
will determine if a significant cause of the disability is the 
claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or 
causes. 
3. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability 
the Commission incorporates the rules of disability determination 
in 20 CFR 404.1520, amended April 1, 1993. The sequential decision 
making process referred to requires a series of questions and 
evaluations to be made in sequence. In short, these are: 
a. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
b. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
c. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the duration 
requirement in 20 CFR 404.1509, amended April 1, 1993, and the listed 
impairments in 20 CFR Subpart P Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993? 
d. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past 
relevant work? 
e. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other 
work? 
4. After the Commission has made a tentative finding of permanent 
total disability: 
a. In those cases arising after July 1,1994, the Commission 
shall order initiation of payment of permanent total disability 
compensation; 
b. the Commission shall review a summary of reemployment 
activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker Reemployment 
Act, as well as any qualified reemployment plan submitted by the 
employer or its insurance carrier; and 
c. unless otherwise stipulated, the Commission shall hold a 
hearing to consider the possibility of rehabilitation and reemployment 
of the claimant pending final adjudication of the claim. 
5. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, 
the Commission shall issue an order finding or denying permanent total 
disability based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due 
consideration of the vocational factors in combination with the 
residual functional capacity which the commission incorporates as 
published in 20 CFR 404 Subpart P Appendix 2, amended April 1, 1993. 
C. For permanent total disability claims arising on or after 
May 1, 1995, Section 34A-2-413 requires a two-step adjudicative 
process. First, the Commission must make a preliminary determination 
whether the applicant 'is permanently and totally disabled. If so, 
the Commission will proceed to the second step, in which the Commission 
will determine whether the applicant can be reemployed or 
rehabi1i tated. 
1. First Step - Preliminary Determination of Permanent Total 
Disability: On receipt of an application for permanent total 
disability compensation, the Adjudication Division will assign an 
Administrative Law Judge to conduct evidentiary proceedings to 
determine whether the applicant's circumstances meet each of the 
elements set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413(1) (b) and (c) . 
(a) If the ALJ finds the applicant meets each of the elements 
set forth in Subsections 34A-2-413 (1) (b) and (c) , the ALJ will issue 
a preliminary determination of permanent total disability and shall 
order the employer or insurance carrier to pay permanent total 
disability compensation to the applicant pending completion of the 
second step of the adjudication process. The payment of permanent 
total disability compensation pursuant to a preliminary determination 
shall commence as of the date established by the preliminary 
determination and shall continue until otherwise ordered. 
(b) A party dissatisfied with the ALJ's preliminary 
determination may obtain additional agency review by either the Labor 
Commissioner or Appeals Board pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-801(3). 
If a timely motion for review of the ALJ's preliminary determination 
is filed with either the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board, no 
further adjudicative or enforcement proceedings shall take place 
pending the decision of the Commissioner or Board. 
(c) A preliminary determination of permanent total disability 
by the Labor Commissioner or Appeals Board is a final agency action 
for purposes of appellate judicial review. 
(d) Unless otherwise stayed by the Labor Commissioner, the 
Appeals Board or an appellate court, an appeal of the Labor 
Commissioner or Appeals Board's preliminary determination of 
permanent total disability shall not delay the commencement of "second 
step" proceedings discussed below or payment of permanent total 
disability compensation as ordered by the preliminary determination. 
(e) The Commissioner or Appeals Board shall grant a request 
for stay if the requesting party has filed a petition for judicial 
review and the Commissioner or Appeals Board determine that: 
(i) the requesting party has a substantial possibility of 
prevailing on the merits; 
(ii) the requesting party will suffer irreparable injury unless 
a stay is granted; and 
(iii) the stay will not result in irreparable injury to other 
parties to the proceeding. 
2. Second Step - Reemployment and Rehabilitation: Pursuant to 
Subsection 34A-2-413 (6) , if the first step of the adjudicatory process 
results in a preliminary finding of permanent total disability, an 
additional inquiry must be made into the applicant's ability to be 
reemployed or rehabilitated, unless the parties waive such additional 
proceedings. 
(a) The ALJ will hold a hearing to consider whether the applicant 
can be reemployed or rehabilitated. 
(i) As part of the hearing, the ALJ will review a summary of 
reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to the Utah Injured Worker 
Reemployment Act; 
(ii) The employer or insurance carrier may submit a reemployment 
plan meeting the requirements set forth in Subsection 
34A-2-413(6)(a)(ii) and Subsections 34A-2-413(6)(d)(i) through 
(iii) • 
(b) Pursuant to Subsection 34A-2-413 (4) (b) the employer or 
insurance carrier may not be required to pay disability compensation 
for any combination of disabilities of any kind in excess of the amount 
of compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable 
permanent total disability compensation rate. 
(i) Any overpayment of disability compensation may be recouped 
by the employer or insurance carrier by reasonably offsetting the 
overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 
312 weeks. 
(ii) An advance of disability compensation to provide for the 
employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process is subject 
to the provisions of Subsection 34A-2-413 (4) (b) , described in 
subsection 2.(b) above, but can be funded by reasonably offsetting 
the advance of disability compensation against future liability 
normally paid after the initial 312 weeks. 
(iii) To fund an advance of disability compensation to provide 
for an employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process, a 
portion of the stream of future weekly disability compensation 
payments may be discounted from the future to the present to 
accommodate payment. Should this be necessary, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall be allowed to reasonably offset the amounts 
paid against future liability payable after the initial 312 weeks. 
In this process, care should be exercised to reasonably minimize 
adverse financial impact on the employee. 
(iv) In the event the parties cannot agree as to the 
reasonableness of any proposed offset, the matter may be submitted 
to an ALJ for determination. 
(c) Subsections 34A-2-413(7) and (9) require the applicant to 
fully cooperate in any evaluation or reemployment plan. Failure to 
do so shall result in dismissal of the applicant's claim or reduction 
or elimination of benefit payments including disability compensation 
and subsistence allowance amounts, consistent with the provisions 
of Section 34A-2-413(7) and (9). 
(d) Subsection 34A-2-413(6) requires the employer or its 
insurance carrier to diligently pursue any proffered reemployment 
plan. Failure to do so shall result in a final award of permanent 
total disability compensation to the applicant. 
(e) If, after the conclusion of the foregoing "second step" 
proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the ALJ shall enter a final order for continuing payment 
of permanent total disability compensation. The period for payment 
of such compensation shall be commence on the date the employee became 
permanently and totally disabled, as determined by the ALJ. 
(f) Alternatively, if after the conclusion of the "second step" 
proceeding, the ALJ concludes that successful rehabilitation and/or 
reemployment is possible, the ALJ shall enter a final order to that 
effect, which order shall contain such direction to the parties as 
the ALJ shall deem appropriate for successful implementation and 
continuation of rehabilitation and/or reemployment. As necessary 
under the particular circumstances of each case, the ALJ's final order 
shall provide for reasonable offset of payments of any disability 
compensation that constitute an overpayment under Subsection 
34A-2-413(4)(b). 
(g) The ALJ's decision is subject to all administrative and 
judicial review provided by law. 
D. For purposes of this rule, the following standards and 
definitions apply: 
1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical 
restrictions and other provisions of the Act and rules, other work 
is reasonably available to a claimant if such work meets the following 
criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of 
the claimant's community would consider to be a typical or acceptable 
commuting distance, or is within the distance the claimant was 
traveling to work prior to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and 
c. The* work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of 
the accident the claimant was earning more than the state average 
weekly wage then in effect; or 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, 
if the employee was earning less than the state average weekly wage 
then in effect. 
2. Cooperation: As determined by an administrative law judge, 
an employee is not entitled to permanent total disability compensation 
or subsistence benefits unless the employee fully cooperates with 
any evaluation or reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate the 
cooperation of the employee using, but not limited to, the following 
factors: attendance, active participation, effort, communication with 
the plan coordinator, and compliance with the requirements of the 
vocational plan. In determining if these factors were met, the ALJ 
shall consider relevant changes in the employee's documents medical 
condition. 
3 . Diligent Pursuit: The employer or its insurance carrier shall 
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The ALJ will evaluate the 
employer or insurance carrier's diligent pursuit of the plan using, 
but not limited to, the following factors: timely payment of expenses 
and benefits outline in the vocational plan, and as required by the 
educational institution providing the vocational training, 
communication with the employee, compliance with the requirements 
of the vocational plan, and timely modification of the plan as required 
by documented changes in the employee's medical condition. 
4. Resolution of disputes regarding "cooperation" and "diligent 
pursuit": If a party believes another party is not cooperating with 
or diligently pursing either the evaluations necessary to establish 
a plan, or the requirements of an approved reemployment or 
rehabilitation plan, the aggrieved party shall submit to the workers1 
compensation mediation unit an outline of the specific instances of 
non-cooperation or lack of diligence. Other parties may submit a 
reply. The Mediation Unit will promptly schedule mediation to 
reestablish cooperation among the parties necessary to evaluate or 
comply with the plan. If mediation is unsuccessful, a party may request 
the Adjudication Division resolve the dispute. The Adjudication 
Division will conduct a hearing on the matter within 30 days and shall 
issue a written decision with 10 days thereafter. 
R612-1-11. Burial Expenses, 
(1) Pursuant to Section 34A-2-418 if death results from an 
industrial injury or occupational disease, burial expenses in ordinary 
cases shall be paid by the employer or insurance carrier up to $8,000. 
Unusual cases may result in additional payment, either voluntarily 
by the employer or insurance carrier or through commission order. 
(2) Beginning in the year 2004 and every two years thereafter, 
the Commission shall review this rule and shall make such adjustments 
as are necessary so that the burial expense provided by this rule 
remains equitable when compared to the average cost of burial in this 
state. 
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Addendum B 
"Order Affirming ALJ's Decision" dated October 31,2007 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
RICHARD D. PRICHARD, \ 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
K-MART, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALJ'S DECISION 
Case No. 03-0493 
Richard D. Prichard asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Marlowe's denial of Mr. Prichard's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the Utah 
Workers* Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 and§ 34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES PRESENTED 
On June 7,2000, Mr. Prichard injured his back while working for K-Mart. K-Mart accepted 
liability for the injury under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act and paid Mr. Prichard's medical 
expenses, temporary disability compensation and permanent partial disability compensation. On 
May 6, 2003, Mr. Prichard filed an application with the Commission to compel K-Mart to also pay 
permanent total disability compensation. 
Judge Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Prichard's claim and then appointed an 
impartial medical panel to consider the medical aspects of the claim. After receiving the panel's 
initial and supplemental reports, Judge Marlowe accepted the panel's findings and, relying on those 
findings and other evidence of record, concluded that Mr. Prichard's circumstances did not meet the 
Act's standards for a preliminary determination of permanent total disability. 
In challenging Judge Marlowe's decision, Mr. Prichard argues that: i) the medical panel did 
not properly evaluate Mr. Prichard's residual functional capacity; and 2) Judge Marlowe did not 
properly analyze Mr. Prichard's claim according to the requirements of § 34A-2-413(l) of the Act 
and associated Commission rules. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact, as supplemented by the additional 
findings included in this decision and summarized as follows. 
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Mr. Prichard is 48 years old and currently lives in Florida. He has a bachelor's degree in 
business management as well as retail sales management experience. He also has military 
experience and training as an administrative specialist and librarian. At the time of the accident 
which gives rise to this claim for permanent total disability compensation, K-Mart employed Mr. 
Prichard as a manager. 
On June 7, 2000, Mr. Prichard was involved in a lifting accident at K-Mart. As a result of 
this accident, he suffered a herniated disc at the L4-5 level of his spine. He underwent surgery on 
August 21,2000, and experienced some temporary improvement. However, the pain in his back and 
legs returned. Since then, Mr. Prichard has received pain medication, physical therapy, steroid 
injections and pain management training. 
Mr. Prichard's back injury left him with a permanent 10% whole person impairment. He 
cannot: I) lift and carry more than 35 pounds; 2) lift and carry more than 18 pounds "frequently"; or 
3) lift and carry more than 9 pounds "constantly". He is also restricted from bending, stooping, 
squatting and climbing, and must be able to occasionally move from standing to sitting positions. 
The Social Security Administration has found Mr. Prichard totally disabled and entitled to social 
security total disability benefits. 
Despite the physical problems and limitations that stem from Mr. Prichard's work-related 
injury, his age, education, past work experience^^and remaining medical and functional capacity 
qualify him to perform other work that is reasonably available to him, both in Florida and in Utah. 
Specifically, there are substantial numbers of available jobs in sales, retail and finance that are within 
Mr. Prichard's physical abilities, and for which he is qualified by education, experience and training. 
These positions appear to be relatively well-paying, with at least some offering annual salaries of 
approximately $40,000. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
As already noted, Mr. Prichard challenges Judge Marlowe's decision on two grounds. First, 
he challenges the adequacy of the medical panel's evaluation. Next, he contends that Judge Marlowe 
did not properly evaluate his claim under the governing provisions of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. These arguments are addressed below. 
Adequacy of medical panel evaluation. Mr. Prichard argues that the medical panel's opinion 
regarding his physical abilities is not supported by any functional capacity testing. Mr. Prichard also 
argues that the panel did not explain the basis for its opinion. In considering these points, the 
Commission notes that the medical panel consisted of three respected experts in the fields of 
orthopedics, neurology and psychiatry. These panelists reviewed Mr. Prichard's entire medical 
history, including the reports and opinions of Mr. Prichard's own treating physicians. Finally, the 
panelists personally examined Mr. Prichard. Based on all this information, and after consulting 
appropriate professional guidelines for the evaluation of disability, the panel concluded that Mr. 
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Prichard's abilities placed him in a "light-to-medium" classification, with the lifting restrictions set 
forth in this decision's findings of fact. In light of the medical panel's expertise and its thorough 
review of Mr. Prichard's case, the Commission finds the panel's opinion to be well-supported and 
adequately explained. 
The Commission also notes Mr. Prichard's argument that Judge Marlowe was obligated to 
hold a hearing to consider the parties' objections to the panel's report However, § 34A-2-
60 l(2)(f)(i) of the Act permits but does not require an ALJ to hold a hearing on such objections. In 
other words, the statute grants the ALJ discretion to determine whether a medical panel hearing is 
necessary. The Commission agrees with Judge Marlowe's judgment that no such hearing was 
required in this case. 
Application of Act to Mr. Prichard's claim. Mr. Prichard seeks a preliminary determination 
by the Commission that he is permanently and totally disabled. Section 34A-2-413(l)(c)(iv) of the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act is the governing statute and provides as follows: 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall conclude 
that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the 
employee's ability to do basic work activities; 
(iii) the industrial . . . impairments prevent the employee from performing the 
essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified 
until the time of the industrial accident. . . ; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into 
consideration the employee's: 
(A) age; 
(B) education; 
(C) past work experience; 
(D) medical capacity; 
(E) residual functional capacity. 
Judge Marlowe determined that, although Mr. Prichard met the requirements of § 413(l)(c)(i) 
through (iii), he did not satisfy § 4l3(l)(c)(iv)'s requirement that he be unable to "perform other 
work reasonably." Mr. Prichard now argues that Judge Marlowe failed to apply the analysis required 
by § 413(l)(c)(iv) and the Commission's Rule R612-1-10.D. 
Rule 612-1-I0.D.1 identifies the subsidiary facts that will be considered in determining 
whether "other work is reasonably available" to an injured worker, as follows: 
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1. Other work reasonably available: Subject to medical restrictions and other 
provisions of the Act and rules, other work is reasonably available to a claimant if 
such work meets the following criteria: 
a. The work is either within the distance that a resident of the claimants community 
would consider to be a typical or acceptable commuting distance, or is within the 
distance the claimant was traveling to work prior to his or her accident; 
b. The work is regular, steady, and readily available; and 
c. The work provides a gross income at least equivalent to: 
(1) The current state average weekly wage, if at the time of the accident the claimant 
was earning more than the state average weekly wage then in effect; or 
(2) The wage the claimant was earning at the time of the accident, if the employee 
was earning less than the state average weekly wage then in effect. 
The Commission agrees with Mr. Prichard's assertion that Judge Marlowe's decision does 
not idfentify or evaluate the "other work" that may be available for Mr. Prichard. The Commission 
has therefore addressed that issue by including additional findings of fact in this decisiop. As noted 
in those supplemental findings, the evidentiary record establishes that work is available to Mr. 
Prichard that is within his medical and functional abilities, is reasonably close to his current 
residence and his former work location in Utah, and pays a sufficient wage. This work is also 
consistent with Mr. Prichard's education, training and experience. With these additional facts, the 
Commission concurs with Judge Marlowe's ultimate determination that Mr. Prichard has not met his 
burden of proving that he cannot perform other work reasonably available to him, as required by § 
34A-2-4l3(l)(c)(iv). Consequently, Mr. Prichard is not entitled to a preliminary finding of 
permanent total disability, 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this 31 day of October, 2007. 
• "i ~ i L _ 
Sherrie Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Richard 
D. Prichard, Case No. 03-0493, was mailed first class postage prepaid th is jyc lay of October, 
2007, to the following: 
Richard D. Prichard 
1348 Amesbury Court 
NPtRichyFL 34655 
KMart 
4670 S 900 E 
Murray UT 84107 
David K. Smith, Esq. 
6925 Union Park Center Ste 600 
Midvale UT 84047 
Mark Sumsion, Esq. 
299SMainStStel500 
P O Box 2465 
Salt Lake City UT 84110 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
POBox 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
801-530-6800 
RICHARD D PRICHARD, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
KMART, 
Respondent 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 2003493 
Judge Deidre Marlowe 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
January 20, 2004. 
Deidre Marlowe, Administrative Law Judge. 
Richard D. Prichard was represented by David K. Smith 
Kmart, was represented by attorney Mark Sumsion 
Richard D. Prichard filed an application for hearing on May 6, 2003 alleging an injury 
date of June 7, 2000 and requesting permanent total compensation. The Respondents filed an 
answer on June 3, 2003 admitting that Petitioner suffered an injury in the course and scope of his 
employment as alleged, for which they have paid various benefits, but defending on the grounds 
that Petitioner is not permanently and totally disabled. The parties stipulated that all appropriate 
benefits have been paid up through July 25, 2002. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued on March 5, 2005 referring the 
medical aspects of this case to a Commission medical panel. The panel issued its report on June 
8, 2005 and it was forwarded to the parties via certified mail on June 9, 2005. The petitioner 
filed a timely objection to the panel's report. The undersigned requested clarification of the 
panel's report which was issued on August 15, 2005 and mailed to the parties via certified mail 
on September 20, 2005. The petitioner filed a timely objection to the panel's report. 
OBJECTIONS TO THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT 
Utah Code § 34A-2-601 contains the procedures for Labor Commission medical panels-
Section 34A-2-60l(2)(d)(i) requires the ALJ to "promptly distribute full copies of the report...by 
certified mail. . . ." Section 34A-2-601(2)(ii) and (iii) outline the objection process and state: 
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection 
(2)(d)(i) is deposited in the United States post office, the following 
may file with the administrative law judge written objections to the 
and administered steroid injections, which gave some relief. He also gave the Petitioner a V-lok 
brace. ME p. 64. 
Petitioner was evaluated by Scot Russell, Ph.D. June 27,2001, who gave the green light 
on the Petitioner's admission to a pain management program. 
Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Jeff Chung on August 29, 2001, who acknowledged his 
condition of failed back syndrome, and who indicates that Petitioner did not show the appearance 
of malingering, hysteria, conversion reaction or symptom magnification. ME p. 153. Dr. Chung 
concludes that Petitioner has less than a 1% chance of having improvement in his symptoms to 
the point of being able to find work in the competitive job market or weaning himself from 
narcotics. ME p. 154. Dr. Chung believes a fusion surgery would only worsen the condition. 
Dr. Chung rates the Petitioner with a 13% whole person impairment, which includes 
consideration of both the back and leg radiculopathy. ME p. 155. 
On January 17, 2002 Dr. Bova's restrictions were limited sitting, standing, bending 
stooping, twisting and that he was not capable of working full time in a primarily seated position 
with the option to stand if needed, in short, "pt is totally disabled." ME p. 75. 
On November 26, 2002 Dr. Scott Knorpp evaluated the Petitioner and concluded that 
Petitioner suffered failed back syndrome with symptom magnification syndrome. Dr. Knorrp 
indicates that Petitioner is not getting any true benefits from his pain medications, and 
furthermore that continued injections are not medically reasonable. Fusion surgery is 
recommended against. In a subsequent report, Dr. Knorpp notes Petitioner's unwillingness to 
put forth a valid effort during his functional capacity evaluation, and because of that there is no 
sound medical foundation to introduce permanent physician imposed restrictions with regard to 
work. ME p. 198. Dr. Knorpp opines that there is no medical reason that the Petitioner cannot 
return to work. 
Petitioner was independently evaluated by Dr. John Barbuto on December 12, 2002. Dr. 
Barbuto notes the Petitioner has clear disc herniation, but also notes "obviously excessive pain 
melodrama" from the Petitioner prior to and during the exam. Dr. Barbuto thinks the condition 
is social posturing rather than a logical biological conclusion and diagnoses a biopsychosocial 
pain syndrome. ME p. 204, 209. Also a 10% impairment rating is assessed. ME p. 211. 
The Petitioner began seeing Dr. Daniel Bender in October 2003. Dr. Bender diagnosed 
chronic low back pain and secondary depression, and prescribed ongoing Oxycontin and other 
drugs. ME p. 221. He also administered nerve blocks. On December 21, 2003 Dr. Bender's 
restrictions were given as: no lifting more than 10 pounds, no standing more than 30 minutes, no 
sitting more than 30 minutes, no bending, stooping, squatting, and the need to lie down 
frequently. ME p. 231. The January 24, 2004 restriction form indicates "unable to work." ME 
p. 230. 
Petitioner received a Social Security disability finding with payments beginning August 
21, 2000 for his lumbar spine injury and back problems. He currently takes 40 mg. Oxycontin 3 
times a day, Neurontin, Percocet for breakthrough pain, Tisdone, and Lexapril, an antidepressant. 
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The petitioner is unable to perform his former work as retail store manager as the result 
of the work related injury. The petitioner's job as a store manager required him to assist in 
unloading trucks and lift items of stock, and to walk, stand, lift and carry beyond his current 
physical restrictions. 
The petitioner can perform other work reasonably available. The petitioner is now 46 
years old and he possesses a bachelor's degree in business management. The petitioner has the 
ability to sit, stand and walk alternately and was able to sit through both the hearing and the 
deposition. The petitioner has the ability to lift up to 35 pounds occasionally and 18 pounds 
frequently. The petitioner worked in management for Kmart supervising 80-90 employees and 
running a large retail store. Prior to working for Kmart, the petitioner was in the military and 
trained as an administrative specialist, running an academic library and maintaining classroom 
materials, and as a heavy equipment operator. The petitioner possesses a high level of education 
and a significant management background. The petitioner has not attempted to seek other 
employment and both the medical panel and Dirk Evertson noted that the most significant 
obstacle to the petitioner's return to employment was his perception of himself as disabled. The 
petitioner's medical restrictions do not prevent him from working in a light category of 
employment and he has significant education and experience in management to find other 
employment in business management, human resources and customer service. Mr. Evertson 
identified employment which meets the petitioner's objective physical capacity and is reasonably 
available to him based upon his current skills and education level. 
The petitioner is not permanently totally disabled as the result of his industrial injury. 
PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 provides that only those injuries arising out of and in the 
course of employment are compensable under the Workers Compensation Act. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18 (Utah 1986), held the statute [current section 34A-2-
401] "...creates two prerequisites for a finding of a compensable injury. First, the injury must be 
'by accident.' Second, the language 'arising out of or in the course of employment' requires that 
there be a causal connection between the injury and the employment." 
For an injury to be compensable under the Act, a petitioner must show by evidence, 
opinion or otherwise that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the 
resulting injury or disability and in the event a petitioner cannot show a medical causal 
connection, compensation should be denied. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986). 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 states in relevant part: 
(I) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident 
or occupational disease, the employee shall receive compensation as 
outlined in this section, 
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the 
employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence 
that: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The petitioner suffered a compensable industrial injury on June 7, 2000 while employed 
by the respondent, KMart 
The petitioner is not permanently totally disabled as the result of the June 7,2000 
industrial injury. 
The petitioner's application for hearing is dismissed with prejudice. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED the petitioner's application for hearing is dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED October _^_, 2005. 
Deidre Marlowe 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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